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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
This is an appeal from the Order of Summary Judgment dated
November

2, 1989, from

the

Eighth

District Court of Uintah

County, Utah.
Jurisdiction is conferred upon the Court because it is an
appeal from a judgment of a District Court over which the Court
of Appeals does not have original appellate jurisdiction,

Utah

Code Annotated, §78-2-2(3).

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Did the lower court err in determining that although

Appellant had no knowledge of his right to a cause of action the
period of limitations would run from the date of injury October
11, 1984.
2.

Is §78-12-25(3), Utah Code Annotated, unconstitutional

as applied to Appellant under Article I, Section 11, of the
Constitution of Utah?
3.

Did the lower court err in failing to find the statute

of limitations was tolled during Appellant's period of incapacity?

TEXT OF AUTHORITIES
Utah Code Annotated, 78-12-25 (3)
1.

... four years...

An action for relief not otherwise provided for by law.

Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 11

2*

All courts shall be open, and every person, for an

injury done to him or his person, property or reputation, shall
have remedy by due course of law, which shall be administered
without denial or unnecessary

delay; and no person

shall be

barred from prosecuting or defending before any tribunal in this
State, by himself or counsel, any civil cause to which he is a
party,

Utah Code Annotated, 78-12-36

3.

If a person entitled to bring an action, other than for

the recovery of real property, is at the time the cause of action
accrued, either under the age of majority or mentally incompetent
and without a legal guardian, the time of the disability is not a
part of the time limit for the commencement of the action.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 6(a)

4.

In computing any period of time proscribed or allowed

by these rules, by the local rules of any district court, by
order of court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act,
event, or default from which the designated period of time begins
to run shall not be included.
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The last day of the period so

O

computed shall be included, unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or
a legal holiday, in which event the period runs until the end of
the next day which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal
holiday,

STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
On October 11, 1984, Appellant was injured by a gunshot when
the pistol he was carrying, which was manufactured by Defendant,
dropped from its holster and discharged.

Appellant was totally

incapacitated and was hospitalized for approximately two weeks.
Obviously, Appellant knew of his physical injury on that
date but had no knowledge of his legal injury as a result of
Defendant's negligent manufacture of the firearm until the spring
of 1988 during an unrelated consultation with his attorney.
action was filed on October 13, 1988.

The

The Court below granted

Defendant's motion for a summary judgment for not having brought
the action within four years of the date of injury.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Point 1:

The period of limitation of action for products

liability must not begin to run until the Appellant has knowledge
he has a cause of action.

A crucial element of such a cause of

action is the negligence or fault of the manufacturer.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

The date

the plaintiff learns of the negligence of Defendant is the date
the period of limitation begins.

Point 2:

Article I, Section 11, of the Utah Constitution

demands that all prohibitions to bringing actions for redress in
our courts must comply with the principle of fairness, equity and
due process.

Under the facts in the present case, a failure to

apply the Discovery Rule to the period of limitation is violative
of the Utah Constitution.

Point 3;

The period of incapacity of Appellant directly

caused by the wrong doing of Defendant should not be included in
the period of limitation.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TIME PERIOD FOR THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS DOES NOT BEGIN TO RUN UNTIL THE PLAINTIFF HAS KNOWLEDGE OF HIS "LEGAL INJURY".
This Court has held that a Plaintiff must have knowledge not
only that he has suffered an injury but that the injury was due
to the negligence of the Defendant.

Foil v. Bolinger, 60 2 P2d

144 (Utah 1979); Christiansen v. Rees, 436 P2d 435 (Utah 1968).
The Discovery

Rule makes

no distinction

between medical

malpractice and other torts. Stateson v. U.S., 629 F2d 1265.

The

Discovery Rule has applications in Federal tort claims, Socialist

R P T F F O F APPF.T.T.ANT

Worker Party, Jordan v. A.G., 64 2 F. Supp. 1357 and throughout
productive
(1983).

liability.

Fidler v. Eastman Kodak, 714 F2d

192

Hager v. Eli Lily Co., 579 F. Supp. 2464; Hansen v. A.

H. Robbin, 338 NW2d 578.

In Hanebath v. Bell Helicopter, 694 P2d

1403 (Alaska 1984) it was held the Discovery Rule must apply to
toll the statute from running where the negligent act is for
whatever circumstances unknown or unknowable.
In Fidler a Plaintiff was well aware of the injury but had
no knowledge the injury was caused by the negligent manufacture
of the Defendant's x-ray machine until after the passage of the
ordinary limitation of action.

The Court there held

[T]he cause of action does not accrue until
the Plaintiff learns or reasonably should
have learned that he has been injured by the
Defendant's conduct.
Directly on point with the case at bar is Stone v. Colt
Industries,

reported

at

CCH

11301

U.S.

District

Court

Massachusetts C.V.A. No. 86-1107-MA, October 31, 1986.

D.

(Adden-

dum, page A-4.)
In Stone, on July 1, 1973, a police officer was doing an
investigation when a pry bar struck the hammer of a gun manufactured by the Defendant Colt.
ly

injured

the Plaintiff.

The

The gun discharged and seriousCourt

found

no

evidence

the

Plaintiff knew of the negligent manufacture of Defendant's gun
until Plaintiff read an advertisement in the fall of 1984, where
it was stated that Colt pistols, like the one he owned, could
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discharge if dropped or were otherwise mishandled and that Colt
would modify the pistols for owners.

The Court found Plaintiff

had filed in a timely manner since he filed within three years
(the

statutory

period

for

Massachusetts)

of

acquiring

the

knowledge of Defendant's negligent manufacture.
In the case before this Court Appellant was
October

injured on

11, 1984, when his pistol fell from its holster and

struck the running board of his truck and discharged.

Appellant

had assumed the discharge was the natural consequence of the gun
falling.

(Plaintiff's

affidavit, paragraph

6, Addendum

page

A-2.)
In the spring of 1988 Appellant consulted with counsel in
another matter.

His attorney, who had independent knowledge as a

gun hobbiest, informed Appellant he may have a claimr as Ruger
pistols such as his were negligently manufactured and were the
subject of recall by the manufacturer, Defendant Sturm Ruger.
The Appellant acquired the knowledge of Defendant's negligent act
in the spring of 1988.
and 9.)

(Plaintiff's affidavit, paragraph 7, 8

Appellant later engaged counsel to prosecute this action

and Appellant filed this action on October 13, 1988, well within
the four year period.
A

critical

balancing

analysis

McDonald, 635 P2d 84 (Utah 1981) .

is

set

out

in Meyers v.

The Discovery Rule provides

that the period of limitation does not begin running until the
discovery of all facts forming the basis for the cause of action.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

Meyers at 86.

In the case at bar the period of limitation begins

when Appellant knows of the negligent manufacture of the firearm.
The negligence of Defendant is clearly an essential element of
Appellant's cause.
Where Defendant has denied its negligence it is incongruous
to suggest Appellant knew or should have known of Defendant's
negligence

at

the

time

of

the

injury.

Under

circumstances

present in this case the failure to apply the Discovery Rule
would be irrational and unjust.
The

hardship

imposed

upon

Appellant

by

the

strict

interpretation of the limitation of action vastly outweighs any
supposed difficulty to Defendant regarding issues of proof due to
the passage of 48 hours.

POINT II
SECTION 78-12-25(3) IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL AS
APPLIED TO PLAINTIFF AS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE
I, SECTION 11f OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.
The

analysis

of

Constitution contained

Article

I,

Section

11,

in Berry v. Beech, 111

of

the

Utah

P2d 670, (Utah

1985) , at 674 is determinative of the case at bar.

While Berry

v. Beech deals with a statute of repose rather than a statute of
limitations the analysis is equally applicable to both.
The open Court's provision, as recognized by this Court,
seeks to insure that every person shall have a remedy comporting
with due process of law.

An interpretation that Appellant is not

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
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entitled to the benefit of the Discovery Rule as opposed to a
victim of medical malpractice would deny Appellant fairness and
equity. Foil v. Bolinger; Legal malpractice, Merkley v. Beaslin,
778 P2d 16,

(Utah App 1989).

The court has similarly ruled

§78-12-25.5, Utah Code Annotated, is unconstitutional as against
Section 11 in Horton v. Goldminers Daughter, 118 Utah Adv. Sh. 37
(Utah 1989), and in Klatt v. Southgate, No. 890120 filed March 2,
1990.
The concept of allowing a reasonable time to seek redress in
court demands the application of the Discovery
balancing analysis as set out in Meyers.

Rule and the

Failure to read a

Discovery Rule interpretation into §78-12-25(3) renders hollow
the right guaranteed by the Constitution of Utah to Appellant.
By Defendant's time calculation the complaint was filed two
days late.

The Appellant was incapacitated

for more than two

weeks following the incident, and had no knowledge of the legal
cause until years later.

See affidavit of Plaintiff, page A-2 of

Addendum.
The redress for medical bills and other compensatory relief
sought by Appellant must be weighed

against the disadvantage

Defendant has suffered due to stale evidence during the two day
lapse.

A failure to use the Discovery Rule analysis under these

facts is thus prohibited by Article I, Section 11, of the Utah
Constitution.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
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POINT III
THE LOWER COURT ERRED BY INCLUDING IN THE
PERIOD OF LIMITATIONS THE PERIOD OF DISABILITY DIRECTLY CAUSED BY DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE.
After the discharge of the firearm on October 11, 1984,
Appellant was hospitalized and underwent surgery for a shattered
Humerous, chest wounds, abdominal wounds and bowel resection.
See Complaint page 2 paragraph 8, at page A-8 of the Addendum.
Appellant was totally incapacitated for approximately two weeks.
See Plaintiff's affidavit, paragraph 5, at page A-3 of Addendum.
Section 78-12-36, Utah Code Annotated

(1953, as amended),

provides in part the period of a disability is not part of time
for the commencement of the action.
Appellant was injured on the 11th of October, 1984, and
immediately underwent surgery with the natural attendant disability and incompetence from surgery and anesthetic.

Defendant's

wrongful conduct caused Appellant to be under such a disability
for approximately two weeks.
The day the operative fact occurs is excluded from the time
computation in computing the statute of limitation.

Rule 6, Utah

Rules of Civil Procedure, Nebola v. Minnesota Iron, 102 Minn 89.
Under the ordinary computation of time, from the date of injury
the time for the commencement of the action would have been
October 12, 1984.

The Complaint was mailed from Salt Lake City,

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
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Utah, on October 11, 1988, and marked as received and filed by
the Court in Vernal, Utah, on October 13, 1988.
Equity demands that where a Defendant's negligence incapacitates a Plaintiff, by causing such great injury he must undergo
major surgery, that the period of limitation be tolled for the
day

of

suffered

surgery

and

no harm

post

operative

or disadvantage

recovery.

by

the Clerk

Complaint on the 13th rather than the 12th.

Defendant

has

entering

the

The principal of

equitable tolling and justice demand that Appellant be allowed to
seek redress for his injuries in our State Courts.

CONCLUSION
The Discovery Rule dictates the time for the commencement of
the action began when Appellant had knowledge of all the elements
of his cause of action.

Certainly that the negligent act of

Defendant which was not known to Appellant until Spring of 1988
is key information which must be known to Appellant before he can
plead a cause of action.

To

comport

with

Thus, the action was timely filed.

Article

I,

Section

11,

of

the

Utah

Constitution, §78-12-25(3) must be interpreted under these facts
to include a Discovery Rule analysis.
Further when Appellant is incapacitated by the negligence of
Defendant it would be grossly inequitable to not find the statute
tolled during his surgery and post operative recovery under these

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

facts, and especially where Defendant has shown no disadvantage.

Respectfully Submitted this

day of March 1990.

K. C. BENNETT
Attorney for Plaintiff/Appellant

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on the ^

- ^ d a y of March, 1990, I

cause to be mailed, postage paid, via U. S. First Class Mail, 4
true and exact copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT, to:

H. James Clegg
Attorney at Law
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
10 Exchange Place, #1100
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

By:
KIRK C. BENNETT
Attorney for Appellant
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IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UINTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

SHIRL L. ATWOOD,
R U L I N G

Plaintiff,
vs.
STURM, RUGER & COMPANY, INC.,

Civil No. 88-CV-233U

Defendant•

Defendant's Motion to Strike the Memorandum and Affidavit of
Plaintiff is denied.

The court has received and considered those

pleadings even though untimely filed.
Plaintiff's Motion for Relief from Ruling is denied, and
Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted.

After con-

sideration of the memoranda filed by the parties the court rules
that the "discovery rule" upon which Plaintiff relies is inapplicable to the instant case, that rule being limited to certain
specified causes of action.

This court agrees with the position

taken by the Supreme Court in Myers v. McDonald, 63 5 P2d 84
wherein it was held that "mere ignorance of the existence of a
cause of action does not prevent the running of the statute of
limitations."

Accordingly, the court has herewith executed the

Summary Judgment submitted by Defendant.
DATED this c3*>c( day of November, 1989.
BY THE COURT:

(j^*******
cc:

H. James Clegg,
Kirk C. Bennett

c^zl

K. C. Bennett
Utah State Bar No. 3700
Of CONDER & WANGSGARD
4059 South 4000 West
West Valley City, Utah 84120
Telephone: (801) 967-5500
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
SHIRL L. ATWOOD,
PLAINTIFF'S AFFIDAVIT IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
-vsSTURN, RUGER & COMPANY, INC.,

C ^ e No. 88CV233U
Judge Dennis Draney

Defendant.

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

ss.
)

Plaintiff, Shirl L. Atwood, having

been

first duly

sworn

upon oath, deposes and says that:
1.

My name is Shirl L. Atwood and I am the Plaintiff in

the above-entitled action.
2.

In the month of October of 1984 I was injured when a

firearm manufactured by Defendant accidently discharged striking
me in the abdomen and arm.
3.

Upon review of records it appears to me this accident

took place on October 11, 1984.

5.

Following the accident

I was totally incapacited and

hospitalized for a period of approximately two (2) weeks.
6.

During

the

time

period

since the accident

until the

Spring of 1988 I had assumed that the discharge of the firearm
was a natural

consequence

of it falling from the holster and

striking the ground.
7.

It was not until the Spring of 1988 that while consulting

with my attorney, K. C. Bennett, on another matter I was informed
I might possibly have a product liability claim against Defendant.
8.

My attorney had independent knowledge that

I did not

have that the Ruger single action pistols of certain production
series were defective and were subject to recall.
9.

This information was not known to me and I had no reason

to suspect ray injuries were the result of uny negligence, act or
design defect of Defendants firearm.
10.

Further Affiant sayeth naught.

SHIRL L. ATWOOD
Plaintiff/Affiant

SWORN AND SUBSCRjBEDv^p b e f o r e
Jtl?4^

day o t

me by S h i r l

L.

Atwood

thi:

Ju^^i^Sai'^v.''^

//?/"
•s—i

~'' '
. ^ ' • •' — w/VT»A*>y pUBI^rC, STATE/ OF UTAH
.ng i r A s a l t Lai&e Coun.ty
WLssidn e x p i r e s
'.^l^M^O

-

2 -

X:Nx
Citation
Not Reported in F.Supp.
1986 WL 13073 (D.Mass.)
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Alvin E. STONE, Plaintiff,
v.
COLT INDUSTRIES OPERATING CORPORATION, Defendant.
Civ. A. No. 8G-1107-MA.
United States District Court, D. Massachusetts.
Oct. 31, 198B.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
Mazzone, District Judge,
The plaintiff, Alvin E. Stone, filed this diversity action for personal
injuries against the defendant, Colt Industries Operating Corporation. Stone
alleges in his amended complaint that Colt designed, manufactured, and sold
defective M 25 ACPM automatic pistols. Stone was injured when one of these
pistols, which he was carrying clipped to his belt with the safety in the "on"
position, discharged a round into his abdomen and thigh after it was "bumped."
Stone asks for damages for Colt Industries' alleged negligence, breach of
implied warranties, and gross, willful, and wanton negligence and breach of
warranty.
COPR. (C) WEST 1989 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOUT. WORKS
Not Reported in F.Supp.
R 1 OF 1
P 2 OF 6
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P
This case is before me on Colt Industries motion to dismiss under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The defendant claims that Stone's action is barred by
the applicable Massachusetts three-year statutes of limitations as the accident
occurred on July 1, 1973, and Stone did not file his complaint until April 8,
1986. Stone claims for the first time in his opposition to this motion that he
did not discover that his injury was caused by a defect in the pistol until
1984, and that he filed his complaint around eighteen months later, well within
the three-year period. As Stone's opposition and accompanying affidavit reveal
matters not set forth in his complaint, I treat the motion to dismiss as one
for summary judgment pursuant to the procedure described in Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b).
Stone's affidavit discloses that at the time of the accident, he was an offduty policeman responding to an emergency call for assistance. He was summoned
to a serious motor vehicle accident, where he and others attempted to free a
person trapped in a vehicle with a pry bar. The pry bar struck the pistol
Stone had clipped to his belt, and a bullet discharged from the gun and injured
him. He assumed at the time that the gun had discharged because the pry bar
had struck it. In the fall of 1984, he saw an advertisement in a magazine
which stated that Colt pistols like the one he owned could accidentally
discharge if dropped or handled carelessly. The advertisement also stated that
Colt would modify the firing mechanism in such pistols to substantially reduce
the possibility of accidental discharge. Stone filed suit a year and a half
COPR. (C> WEST 1989 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOUT. WORKS
Not Reported in F.Supp.
R 1 OF 1
P 3 OF 6
ALLFEDS
P
after reading this advertisement.
I must decide whether Stone has filed his action in a timely manner. Since
the federal courts apply state statutes of limitations in diversity cases, and
since Massachusetts considers such statutes to be concerned with remedies and
governed by the law of the forum, I apply the time periods prescribed by
Massachusetts statutes. See Molinar v. Western Elec. Co., 525 F.2d 521, 531
(1st Cir.1975), cert, denied, 424 U.S. 978 (1976). Stone's claim for
negligence is governed by Mass.G.L. c. 260, s 2A, which provides that "actions
of tort ... shall be commenced only within three years ne*t after the cause of

action accrues." The breach of warranty claim is governed by Mass.G.L. c.
106, a 2-318, which provides that M(a)ll actions under this section shall be
commenced within three years next after the date the injury and damage occurs."
I must determine when these two three-year periods began to run. In
Fidler v. Eastman Kodak Co., 714 F.2d 192, 196-197 (1st Cir.1983), the court
decided that "the cause of action does not accrue until the plaintiff learns or
reasonably should have learned that he has been injured by the defendant's
conduct" for both negligence and breach of warranty claims in a products
liability action. The court's approach to this unsettled area of Massachusetts
law was confirmed by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court in a related
case, Fidler v. E.M. Parker Co., 394 Mass. 534, 544 (1985), when that court
stated that H(t)he court's application of the discovery rule is consistent with
COPR. (C) WEST 1989 NO CLAIM TO ORIG. U.S. GOUT. WORKS
Not Reported in F.Supp.
R 1 OF 1
P 4 OF 6
ALLFEDS
P
our recognition of 'the principle that a plaintiff should be put on notice
before his claim is barred.' " (citation omitted). Colt Industries must thus
show that Stone learned or reasonably should have learned that he was injured
by the defendant's conduct more than three years before he filed his action.
Viewing the record in the light most favorable to the opposing party and
indulging all inferences in that party's favor for purposes of summary
Judgment, Voutour v. Uitale, 761 F.2d 812, 817 (1st Cir.1985), cert, denied,
106 S.Ct. 879 (1986), I find that Colt Industries has not met this burden. The
defendant has not contested Stone's affidavit testimony that he had no actual
knowledge that the firing mechanism in his pistol might be defective until he
read the magazine advertisement in the fall of 1984. Stone then filed his
claim in April of 1986, well within the three-year limitations period. (FN1)
Nor has the defendant shown, on the record before me, that Stone should
reasonably have known or suspected that his injury was caused by a defect in
the pistol. The circumstances surrounding the discharge of the gun, including
the manner in which the pry bar struck it, might well have led Stone reasonably
to conclude that it was the pry bar which caused the discharge. However, I do
not foreclose the possibility that summary judgment might be appropriate for
the defendant once discovery has been undertaken and the circumstances
concerning the discharge of the gun are brought to light.
I am left with one matter of procedural concern. The present amended
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complaint on its face shows only that Stone brought his action so long after he
received his injury that his claim would ordinarily be barred by the
limitations period. Stone is required to plead the discovery rule exception to
the statute of limitations defense, or face dismissal of the complaint. See
Kmcheloe v. Farmer, 214 F.2d 604, 605 (7th Cir.1954); Stewart Coach Indus, v.
Moore, 512 F.Supp. 879, 886 (S.D.Ohio 1981), Fed.R.Civ.P. 9(f). Yet Stone
responded to Colt Industries' motion to dismiss not by seeking leave to amend
his complaint to plead the discovery rule exception, but instead by filing an
affidavit which raised that issue. As Stone must affirmatively plead the
exception, I will allow him ten days in which to file another amended
complaint. Colt Industries may then, if appropriate, address any new matters
raised by the amendments under either Rule 12 or Rule 56. See Hailey v. Yellow
Freight Sys., 599 F.Supp. 1332, 1334 (W.D.Mo.1934 ). If Stone does not amend
his complaint as set forth above, I will dismiss the action.
SO ORDERED.
FN1. In 1973, when Stone received his injury, the limitations periods for
actions of tort and breach of warranty were both two years. These periods
were increased to three years in 1974. The +hree-year periods apply to
Stone's claims because the defendant has not shown that Stone 5 cause of
action accrued before he discovered that his pistol might be defective in
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1984.
D.Mass.,1986.
Stone v. Colt Industries Operating Corp.
1986 WL 13073 <D.Mass. )
END OF OOCUMENT

Scott R. Wangsgard 3376
Kirk C. Bennett 3700
Of CONDER & WANGSGARD
4059 South 4000 West
West Valley City, Utah 84120
Telephone: (801) 967-5500
Attorneys for Plaintiff
IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR
UINTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
)

SHIRL L. ATWOOD,
I

Plaintiff,

C O M P L A I N T

-vsSTURM, RUGER & COMPANY, INC.

;>
)

Civil No.
Judge:

Defendants.
Plaintiff, Shirl L. Atwood,

by

and through his attorneys

of record, for cause of action alleges as follows:
1.

Plaintiff, Shirl L. Atwood, is a resident of Vernal, Uintah

County, State of Utah.
2.

Defendant, Sturm, Ruger & Company, Inc., is a corporation

engaged in the manufacture and sale of firearms.
3.

Defendant, Sturm, Ruger & Company,

Inc., manufacture,

distribute, and sell firearms, expecting these firearms to reach
consumers in the condition

in which they are manufactured and

sold knowing, or with reason to know, that they will be used
without inspection for defects.

4.

On

or

about

the

20th

day

of

October,

1984,

while

Plaintiff was using the above-described firearm in a reasonably
foreseeable manner, Plaintiff was injured when the firearm accidently discharged

striking Plaintiff

in the abdomen, chest and

upper arm.
5.

At the time of its manufacture and sale, the firearm was

defective and unreasonably dangerous because of its propensity to
fire when jolted.

Plaintiff was unaware of any defects in the

firearm.
6.

The

condition

of

the

firearm

remained

substantially

unchanged from the time of manufacture to the time of Plaintiff's
injury.
7.

Defendant

was

aware

of

several

substantially

similar

prior accidents involving the same make and model firearm, but
did not take adequate measures to remedy the defects.
8.

As

a

direct

and

proximate

result

of

the

defective

condition of the firearm, Plaintiff suffered serious and severe
personal injuries, specifically a shattered humerus at mid shaft,
chest and abdomenal wounds requiring, among other procedures, a
colostomy.
9.

As

condition of

a

direct
the

and

proximate

firearm,

Plaintiff

result
has

of

the

defective

sustained

permanent

disability of more than fifty percent (50%).
10.

As

a direct

and

proximate

result

of

the

defective

condition of the firearm, the Plaintiff has incurred expenses for
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medical care, including

the services

of physicians, surgeons,

nurses, and hospitals, and will incur further medical expenses in
the future•
11.

As

a direct

and

proximate

result

of

the defective

condition of the firearm, the Plaintiff was unable to engage in
his regular employment for one year resulting in lost earnings
estimated to be $10,000.00,
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays for judgment against Defendants,
jointly and severally, in the following amounts:
1.

Physical injury $500,000.00;

2.

Hospital and medical expenses $7,500.00;

3.

Lost earnings $10,000.00;

4.

Punitive damages $1,500,000.00;

5.

Plaintiff's attorneys1 fees and costs incurred herein;

6.

For such other and further relief as the Court deems just

and,

and proper.
DATED this

/ /

day of October, 1988.
CONDER & WANGSGARD

[IRK C. BENNETT
Attorneys for Plaintiff
Plaintiff's address:
424 East 4500 South
Vernal, Utah 84078
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